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I. INTRODUCTION

Every once in a while, a ground shaking, paradigm-shifting idea is advanced that seems, after
the fact, obvious. It is perhaps the obviousness of the idea that explains both why it escaped
notice for so long and why it holds the promise for lasting, meaningful reform. Professor Marsha
Garrison advances just such an idea: that child maltreatment, like any serious public health
problem, “demand[s] a medical, not an ideological, response” and should emphasize
“prevention, the key to most successful public health campaigns.”1

Marshalling damning

evidence that “after more than twenty years of state and federal initiatives aimed at bettering the
prospects of abused and neglected children”2 with few gains and little progress, Professor
Garrison goes back to the beginning to discern how the child protection services (“CPS”) system
managed to get so far off track. She lays blame at the feet of reformers, who relied not on
evidence but on a “simplistic, antiauthoritarian ideology that cast the state child welfare system
as villain and the families served by that system as victims.”3 These reformers neglected to see
how limited the treatment options they could offer families were, or the “lack of hard data” about
their efficacy.4

As Professor Garrison documents, many of the formative decisions giving us the modern
CPS system were not sufficiently fleshed out at the time they were made. Making decisions with
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imperfect information is, sadly, the context in which regulators always operate.5 There is, of
course, nothing malign about making decisions with limited information if the decisions
represent honest suppositions that just did not pan out. However, once the decisions are made,
Professor Garrison makes clear, the child welfare system never manages to go back and assess
the decisions anew, with better and more information in hand.6 She argues that the CPS system
should evaluate its efforts in light of new evidence, as any medical system would.7 This call for
a searching self-examination based on hard evidence, at once obvious and overlooked, may be
the most significant point Professor Garrison makes.

The reasons why regulators should pay attention to Professor Garrison’s reframing go much
deeper, however. Professor Garrison’s public health lens can do useful work at the micro level,
evaluating and fine tuning day-in-and-day-out decisions, just as on a macro level it can guide the
structure of the CPS system.

Day-in and day-out decisions, like the structural decisions

Professor Garrison unclothes, have deep value choices embedded within them that sometimes
turn out with scrutiny to be mere wishful thinking or groundless supposition.

This Comment will use the public health lens Professor Garrison has developed so richly to
look at one of the most critical questions CPS caseworkers and other decision makers face
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thousands of times a day: whether to remove a child who is a possible victim of abuse or neglect
from his or her home. Removal, as Professor Garrison observes, is the reflexive, instantaneous
default at the inception of most CPS investigations.8 Yet, it need not be if the question of initial
response was analyzed with the evidence-based approach Professor Garrison advocates.

Like the myths that shaped the CPS system into one that sometimes ill-serves the interests of
children, a cluster of wrong-headed beliefs and misunderstandings drive the decision to remove a
child, often needlessly, from his or her home. Few decisions are as determinative of a child’s
well being and long-term prospects as the decision to remove or not. As Professor Garrison
observes, a child who is removed is “at serious risk” of being stranded in “unstable, impermanent
placements … until adulthood.”9 A removed child may lose all contact with his or her family for
long stretches of time,10 may “develop feelings of guilt or unworthiness, especially if [he or she]
was the one to disclose the abuse,”11 and may experience serious psychological damage or
physical abuse while placed outside the home.12 Sometimes removal "places a child in a more
detrimental situation than he would be in without intervention.”13

Yet, CPS caseworkers often see no other recourse when a parent or other adult in the child’s
8
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home is accused of abuse.14 Many believe, wrongly, that a non-abusing parent who fails once to
protect the child from the abusing parent will do so again and again.15 Many caseworkers also
believe, wrongly, that excluding alleged offenders from the home is legally impermissible;
consequently they believe there is no safe choice but to remove the child.16 Ironically, many
caseworkers and other decision makers falsely believe that only the child-victim is at risk from
the alleged offender, and therefore remove only that child. Yet, in cases of intra-familial sexual
abuse, perpetrators rarely stop with the first victim. In one study of perpetrators, four-fifths of
biological father offenders abused more than one child in the household by their own account.17
In a second study of father-daughter incest, biological fathers molested 82% of all daughters
available to them, while stepfather-offenders molested 70% of all daughters.18 This Comment
argues that the child protection system legally can, and should, remove the alleged offender from
the home rather than removing the child-victim. Removing an alleged offender makes the home
safer not only for the child-victim, but for every child living there.

Using Professor Garrison’s evidence-based approach, this Comment demonstrates that we
have come a long way since Florence Rush asked in 1974, “[h]as anyone thought of the fantastic
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notion of getting rid of the [accused] father?”19 Part II dissects the empirical factors driving the
decision to remove children from their home. It examines how judges and legislators in nine
states have laid the groundwork for excluding the alleged offender pending a full investigation so
that this response is no longer unthinkable, unachievable, or fraught with enormous legal risk.
Part III illustrates that baseless suppositions of “maternal culpability”20 have led caseworkers
reflexively to remove the victim, rather than pursuing the more direct and meaningful remedy of
removing the threat to the child’s safety. Part IV argues that a shift in CPS’ default remedy
protects not only the victim, but his or her siblings who, left within the alleged offender’s
immediate grasp, would likely become the next victim. Finally, Part V considers and ultimately
rejects several possible limitations of accepting as the default remedy in cases of alleged child
abuse, the exclusion of the alleged offender from the home.

II. UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION TO REMOVE CHILDREN

Traditionally, ensuring an alleged victim’s safety meant removing the child from the home
and evaluating the merits of the allegations later. In cases of sexual abuse, that approach lead to
an abysmal reality. Ninety-three percent of all offenders remain within the child’s environment
or return home in the first year.21 Less than 2% of all suspected offenders are convicted, while
only 7% of offenders whose abuse is substantiated are jailed for more than a year.22
19
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In a study of factors influencing the state’s decision to remove a child from her home,
Theodore Cross and colleagues found that “the decision not to prosecute was the strongest
predictor of child placement” outside the home.23 The prosecution decision matters because “[i]f
cases are not accepted for prosecution… the child’s removal from the home … may be the only
way to protect the child.”24 In this instance, child placement is seen “as the lesser of the two
evils.”25

This Hobson’s choice grows out of a deep misconception that CPS cannot legally exclude
offenders from their homes absent prosecution—despite the fact that states can, and do, remove
children from their homes everyday.26 Rebecca Bolen, a child abuse researcher, observes that
“removing the alleged offender instead of the victim from the child’s environment … may be
one of the most difficult policy changes because it conflicts with society’s presumption that the
accused is innocent until proven guilty.”27 Christopher Bagley and Kathleen King have also
argued that “[a] proper legal framework which would enable the child to remain with her mother
while the alleged offender is removed, still has to be established.”28
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Child abuse researchers are not alone in believing that the exclusion of offenders from their
homes is legally risky.

Law professor Katherine Pearson notes that “so-called voluntary

agreements” in which CPS workers negotiate a parent’s exit rather than removing the child, open
“the door to recovery of damages from the social worker because of violations of the parents’
rights to substantive and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.”29 Given
these views, it is hardly surprising that over 90% of offenders “are allowed to stay within the
child’s environment, whereas the majority of children are removed from their homes.”30

In contrast to the United States, ultimatums to parents to exit the home are customary in other
countries. In Great Britain the accused parent can be ordered “to leave a dwelling-house in
which he is living with the child.”31 This is the “preferred course of action” when a child is at
risk from someone living in their home.32

The United States actually shares more common ground with Great Britain than scholars and
caseworkers realize. Nine jurisdictions in the United States explicitly authorize state judges to
issue, and CPS agencies to seek, protective orders directing an alleged offender to vacate the
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home.33 Absent egregious conduct, courts routinely insulate caseworkers from liability when
they give alleged offenders ultimatums to leave their homes.34

A. Absolute and Qualified Immunity for CPS Workers
Some courts give CPS caseworkers absolute immunity like that given to judges for the
performance of certain duties, largely so that they are “free to exercise their discretion without
fear of personal consequences.”35

Without such insulation, “[i]ndividual caseworkers and

supervisors facing the possibility of losing their life savings in a law suit might allow fear to
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influence their decisions, intentionally or otherwise.”36

Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extends absolute immunity to
state CPS workers when investigating child abuse allegations, performing placement services, or
placing a child in a foster home.37 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
confers absolute immunity on guardians ad litem who represent the child’s interests when
“testifying in court, prosecuting custody or neglect petitions, and making reports and
recommendations to the court.”38 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
also extended absolute immunity to CPS workers, a psychologist, and two psychiatrists in suits
terminating parental rights.39

Other courts provide a more limited form of qualified immunity where state officials still
enjoy broad protection from civil liability under qualified immunity. As the Third Circuit
explained in Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services,
[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the government
from interfering in familial relationships unless the government adheres to the
requirements of procedural and substantive due process....
36

In determining

Gottlieb v. County of Orange 871 F.Supp 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y., 1994).
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whether [a parent’s] constitutionally protected interests were violated, we must
balance the fundamental liberty interests of the family unit with the compelling
interests of the state in protecting children from abuse.40
Although fundamental, the rights of parents in their children are not unlimited. Instead they are:
limited by the compelling governmental interests in the protection of children—
particularly where the children need to be protected from their own parents....
The right to familial integrity, in other words, does not include a right to remain
free from child abuse investigations.... Whatever disruption or disintegration of
family life [a parent] may have suffered as a result of [a] child abuse investigation
does not, in and of itself, constitute a constitutional deprivation....41

Under this calculus, a social worker receives qualified immunity where he or she acts on the
basis of “some reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a
child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse"42 or, in the words of another court,
upon “an objectively reasonable suspicion of abuse.”43 If such a basis exists, CPS will be
justified in removing either a child or a parent from the home, "even where later investigation
proves no abuse occurred.”44

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals appears to ratchet up the level of protection for
it seeks to sever the parent-child relationship permanently. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759
(1982)(explaining that the state must show grounds to terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence).
40
Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d 1123, 1125-26 (3d Cir. 1997).
41
Id.
42
Croft v. Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, 103 F.3d at 1126.
43
Puricelli et al. v. Houston et al., 2000 WL 760522, *8 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
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caseworkers even further. It has said that,
a social worker acting to separate parent and child [will] rarely will have the
luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion, as prison medical officials can. As a
result, in order for liability to attach, a social worker need not have acted with the
"purpose to cause harm," but the standard of culpability for substantive due
process purposes must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and
reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed "shocks the
conscience.” 45

Importantly, in analyzing claims of due process violations by “excluded” parents, courts
apply precisely the same test they apply when considering whether children should have been
removed.46 They have not crafted more exacting tests, as one would expect, if a parent’s
interests in not being excluded from the home are so much greater than the child’s interests in
not being removed.47
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B. CPS Workers and Agencies Are Given Wide Latitude in Acting
Of course, tests like these are abstractions. It is their application to specific facts that reveals
the vast latitude courts have given caseworkers. Gottlieb v. County of Orange, a case in which
an excluded father ultimately failed to recover against anyone after appealing to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals several times, is a good example of the great latitude given to
caseworkers.48 CPS caseworkers directed Gottlieb to either leave his home based on his alleged
abuse of his daughter, or face her removal.49 The father exited for a month and later sued,
alleging violations of his civil rights.50 The Court found that the caseworkers had an objectively
reasonable basis for acting and were therefore immune from suit, even though they never
investigated the anonymous informant’s background or motives, failed to question the daughter
in a neutral, nondirective manner, and asked “neither the daughter's teacher nor the school nurse,
if the child exhibited any behavioral oddities.”51 The Court refused to fault the caseworkers
because they had not been trained in more sophisticated and less suggestive means of
interviewing.52

The father in the case also sued the County and its Department of Social Services
(“Department”).53 While the lower court initially denied requests to have the claim dismissed,
the court ultimately granted summary judgment to the County in a later round of litigation based

48
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Gottlieb v County of Orange, 871 F Supp 625, 629, (S.D.N.Y 1994).
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on undisputed evidence that the County adequately trained its caseworkers.54 The Department
also acted reasonably, the Court found, in issuing an ultimatum to exit without “pausing to obtain
a court order” since their source reported ongoing abuse, the daughter herself described repeated
molestations at her father’s hands, said that her father did not like tattletales, and said that she
expected to be punished for talking about it outside of the home.55 In the final analysis, the
father prevailed against no defendant.56

Consider also the Third Circuit’s decision in Miller v. City of Philadelphia, which involved
the temporary removal of three children from their mother based on a sloppy investigation.57 A
CPS investigator asked the children leading questions, requested that the mother produce all
three children for a physical exam even though the abuse allegation pertained to only one child,
met secretly with a hospital social worker, excluded the mother's attorney from the waiting area
outside the examination room, and was advised by a doctor that it was not clear whether the
child's bruises were accidental or the result of physical abuse.58 Not surprisingly, the caseworker
received employment reviews that he did not always follow proper procedures.59 Still, the Court
concluded that "[e]ven if all of the facts alleged … were true, [the investigator] did not act in a
way that shocks the conscience.”60 Clearly, Miller sets a high bar for actionable conduct.

54
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Similarly, in In re A.H.,61 the court considered a father’s complaint about his removal from
the home. Although the father alleged a number of due process violations, the court could not
“find fault in the [lower] court’s decision to remove Father from the home” since the daughter
was abused by him and qualified as a child in need of supervision.62

The same treatment extends to physical abuse cases. For instance, in Patterson v. Armstrong
County Children and Youth Services, county officials were found to have acted reasonably when
they temporarily removed a 15-year old daughter based on the fact that her mother pulled the
child from their car by her hair, wrestled her to the ground and pushed her face in a gravel
driveway.63 This caused minor bruises, cuts and scrapes, and the child arrived at school visibly
distressed.64

As this review of the cases makes apparent, the courts afford wide latitude to caseworkers in
their decisions to remove either the children or the abusing parents from the home in a number of
contexts, despite due process challenges that excluded parents often raise.

C. Courts Will Overlook CPS Misdeeds When Others Could Correct Them

Even particularly egregious acts may be insulated from liability where a wronged parent
cannot connect the act to the alleged constitutional violation. In Miller v. City of Philadelphia, a
61

In re A.H., 751 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. App. 2001).
Id. at 700 (noting that the due process issue was unremarkable).
63
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mother who temporarily lost custody of her three children alleged that a child welfare worker
attempted to induce the examining hospital to falsify records and misrepresent the physician's
medical report to the judge who issued the temporary child custody order.65

The trial court

found that the caseworker was not entitled to qualified immunity.66 After several rounds of
appeals, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “even if [the caseworker] did
misrepresent the doctor's report to [the prosecutor, the mother] failed to establish a causal
connection between the alleged misrepresentation and the Judge's decision to grant a separation
order.”67 Although she had ample opportunity, the mother chose not to depose the physician or
prosecutor, “both of whom would have had direct knowledge of [the caseworker’s]
misstatements or misdeeds.”68

Moreover, the prosecutor “spoke independently with [the

physician] to ascertain his opinion,” which “should have served to expose any lies.”69
Consequently, “any subsequent misstatements by [the prosecutor] to the Judge during their
telephone hearing would not have been caused by” the caseworker.70 Even these questionable
tactics by a CPS agency failed to trigger findings of Due Process violations.

Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit tossed out a jury verdict in favor
of an excluded father where he failed to avail himself of opportunities to clarify how long he
needed to stay away.71 In Terry v. Richardson, a three-year old girl, Jaidah, returned from visits

64
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67
Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 374 (3d Cir., 1999).
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at her father’s house withdrawn and afraid of other men.72 When asked by her mother whether
she and her father had any “secrets,” Jaidah said yes—at which time her mother, Richelle,
contacted Cheryl Richardson, a caseworker.73 Richardson left Jaidah’s father, John Terry, a
message the next morning informing him that he should not see or contact Jaidah.74 John Terry
called back and seemed to understand the reasoning.75

Two physicians corroborated the

existence of sexual abuse, and for the next month and a half Jaidah continued to implicate her
father when questioned about the abuse.76 During this time, Jaidah missed one scheduled visit
with Terry because of illness.77

Richardson interviewed Terry 15 days into the investigation and again advised him not to
contact Jaidah until the investigation was complete.78 On the 48th day, she called Terry to inform
him that her investigation was complete and that Jaidah’s accusations seemed valid.79 Terry
denied ever having received the message. Richelle then obtained an order prohibiting Terry’s
visitation with Jaidah.80 Subsequently, a dependency court81 found that Jaidah had been abused,
but not by Terry.82 Terry brought suit against Richardson and a jury awarded him $2,062 and
Jaidah $7,210.83
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the verdict, finding no
constitutional rights had been infringed.84

The court reasoned that, first, Terry had ample

opportunity to ask Richardson about the extent of her authority; and second, any incursion on
Terry’s rights was minor—at most, Richardson prevented Terry from seeing Jaidah for one
day.85

While the court noted that “arbitrary abuses of government power are checked by

requiring objective justification for steps taken during the investigation,” it found such
justification here.86

D. Caseworkers Stepping Over The Line

Although courts accord caseworkers significant protection, caseworkers can nonetheless
exceed even the wide latitude given them.

Suborning perjury, inducing medical providers to

falsify records, or misrepresenting a medical report to the presiding judge, as alleged in Miller,
all may jeopardize the immunity courts are prepared to confer.87
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In addition to the above, reckless disregard for the facts is also not prudent. In Croft v.
Westmoreland County Chilfren & Youth Services, the court found that a caseworker lacked
“objectively reasonable grounds” when she threatened a father that she would remove his child if
he did not exit the home.88

The caseworker’s threat was based on an anonymous tip passed

along a chain of four persons and lacked corroboration.89 The caseworker acknowledged that
she renewed her ultimatum to the father even after her interviews with the informing parties left
her with no “opinion one way or the other” that the father was sexually abusing his son.90

Furthermore, where an objectively reasonable basis does not clearly support a caseworker’s
actions, courts will allow litigation to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage. In Puricelli
et al. v. Houston et al., a social worker allegedly issued an ultimatum to a father suspected of
abuse to leave his home based on an anonymous and uncorroborated reports of abuse.91 By
allowing the father’s lawsuit to proceed to trial, the court permitted a jury to decide whether the
social worker had a reasonable basis for issuing the ultimatum.92

E. What’s So Radical About Excluding Accused Offenders?

Although caseworkers can issue ultimatums to alleged abusers to exit their homes without
risking a lawsuit, a stronger case needs to be made for excluding alleged offenders and leaving
the children in place. There are compelling reasons for taking this approach.
88
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A child who has endured abuse at the hands of an adult should not then be subjected to the
“double victimization” of “system-induced trauma” that force children to leave familiar
surroundings and the comfort of their mothers and siblings.93 This trauma can be considerable.

A removed child is often cut off from all contact with the non-abusing parent for extended
periods of time.94 The removed child may “develop feelings of guilt or unworthiness, especially
if [he or she] was the one to disclose the abuse.”95 While not every removed child is fostered,
those who are placed in foster care may experience serious psychological damage.96

Sometimes removal "places a child in a more detrimental situation than he would be in
without intervention.”97

A 1999 study found that foster care was a significant risk factor for

sexual abuse and that foster parents were the perpetrator in nearly one third of the cases
studied.98 In another study, foster fathers and other foster family members were the perpetrators
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of abuse in over two-thirds of the substantiated cases.99

In many instances, the child’s abuse at the hands of a foster parent is no surprise to the State.
James Rosenthal and colleagues found in 1991 that reports of child sexual abuse while in out-ofhome placements—defined to include family foster care, group homes, residential treatment, and
institutions—were the most likely to be confirmed.100 Moreover, Rosenthal and colleagues
found that in 27% of all maltreatment reports, prior allegations against the perpetrator were
present.101 As Richard Gelles notes, "in some cases, foster parents are actually more dangerous
to the child than the biological parents are.”102

Excluding the alleged perpetrator makes the home a safer environment not only for the
victim, but also for every child in the house, as Part IV documents more fully.103 Exclusion also
offers benefits in addition to safety. The support a child receives from her non-offending parent
moderates the long-term effects of the abuse.104

Even where a child is not directly victimized, removal can be a bad idea. Separation
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frustrates the “laborious task of putting lives back together,”105 since the “essential nucleus” of
the healing process is the mother-child relationship.106 Removal also exposes the child to a
litany of ills caused by "foster care drift.”107 The extent of this dislocation cannot be understated.
In one study, 13% of sexually abused children placed in foster care experienced six or more
different displacements.108

Disrupting the parent’s life, rather than the child’s, is preferable where the allegations
initially appear true or, worse, are ultimately founded. As one court noted in a domestic violence
case, “[a] victim of … outrageous and life-threatening sort of abuse … cannot be held hostage to
the potential homelessness of her abuser, who created the intolerable situation in the first
instance.”109 Exclusion seems especially compelling where "the father ... is responsible for the
choice to eroticize [his] relationship with [his child].”110 He should “bear the consequences of
that choice even when he is not prosecuted.”111 Otherwise, offenders are externalizing the cost
of their behavior to their victims who, ironically, are removed for their own safety.

Guam and Hawaii essentially take this approach. In Guam, the court must first give “due
consideration to ordering the removal … of the alleged perpetrator from the child’s family
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home” before removing the child.112 In Guam and Hawaii, the child’s family bears the “burden
of establishing that it is not in the best interests of the child that the alleged perpetrator be
removed from the family’s home.”113

Texas errs on the side of the child even more forcefully. If the state CPS agency determines
“the child would be protected in the child’s home by the removal of the alleged perpetrator,” the
agency “must file a petition” to exclude the alleged offender.114 The court must exclude the
parent from the home where it finds that the child has been sexually abused and “there is
substantial risk” that he or she will be abused again if the parent remains in the residence.115

The radicalness of this approach is more apparent than real. Domestic violence protective
orders are issued countless times a day.116 Obviously, the key remedy is the court’s order to the
batterer to “stay away.”117 States do not consider this radical jurisprudence.118 Excluding an
accused parent also mirrors actions taken in divorce disputes between adults. Courts routinely
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direct one spouse to leave the home.119 Finally, children are removed every day without even a
passing reference to the considerable power being wielded by the State.120

The government routinely acts preemptively before criminal adjudications. Bond hearings
commonly “place restrictions on …. place of abode of the person during the period of release”
when that person poses an “unreasonable danger to the community.”121 All jurisdictions in the
United States take such a concern into consideration.122 Literally thousands of times each day,
judges place restrictions on persons presumed innocent. Concededly, a bond follows arrest but,
as with allegations of abuse, there has been no hearing on the merits or conviction.

Moreover, viewing this remedy through a public health lens, as Professor Garrison does,
highlights the considerable power we have given the state to contain threats to the public welfare.
Every state is authorized to contain the risk of infectious disease with means that override the
narrow autonomy interests of individual persons posing a threat. Professor Gostin observes that
"[t]hrough the exercise of compulsory powers, public health officials can require that people who
pose a threat to public health submit to medical examination, testing, immunization, treatment,
counseling, detention, isolation or quarantine. Such restrictions may infringe an individual's right
to travel, secure privacy, maintain autonomy or associate."123 As Part IV illustrates in great
detail, parents who offend against children in their care engage in foreseeable patterns of
119
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predation, moving from one child to the next. Their exclusion from the home is necessary to
contain the risk they pose to not only the victim, but other children in the household.

F. Due Process Concerns

Ultimatums raise significant and legitimate due process concerns. Caseworkers may be
tempted to use “voluntary” agreements as a means of short-circuiting the normal protections
built into the CPS system. Pearson notes that “authorities sometimes employ coercive tactics …
as an avoidance of procedural safeguards for the handling of child abuse investigations.”124 This
short-circuiting of the normal procedural protections simply cannot be condoned.

Forbidding exclusion is not the solution to such over-reaching, however. Instead, we should
institutionalize and heavily regulate this remedy, as several states do. Maine extends the same
process protections to parents who are asked to exit the home as it does when pursuing the
equally drastic remedy of removing the child.125 These protections include providing legal
counsel for the parent, a guardian ad litem for the child, notice and opportunity to participate in a
hearing and, where the order was issued on an emergency basis, a preliminary hearing within
fourteen days.126
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Texas requires notice, a fourteen-day limit for any temporary restraining order, and the
satisfaction of a four-part test before a temporary restraining order may issue.127 The state must
show that there “is no time, consistent with the physical health or safety of the child, for an
adversary hearing.”128 Kentucky courts instruct judges who issue orders to alleged perpetrators
to “stay out of the family home” to do so with great specificity – defining the specific distance
that the person should stay away.129 Protective orders in New York must be for a specified time
period, initially not to exceed a year, unless certain aggravating circumstances exist.130

Importantly, these statutes do not simply duplicate the protection already available under
domestic violence statutes – although many of the latter would also be available to protect
children.131 Domestic violence statutes are
intended "[t]o allow family and household members who are victims of domestic
abuse to obtain effective, short-term protection against further abuse...."

19

M.R.S.A. § 761(1) (emphasis added). Any protective order issued under [such a
statute] is granted for a limited time only, not to exceed one year, and is subject to
interim review at either party's request.132
The Maine court cautioned counsel that protective orders are “not the most efficient use of
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litigation resources for the final resolution of the controversy” over access to the child.133 As the
Court explained, “once a temporary order safeguard[s] the child from immediate harm,”
proceedings to assure the child’s safety permanently – as CPS proceedings do – should have
followed.134

In contrast to domestic violence statutes, which generally require someone to declare “protect
me,”135 exclusion statutes do not rely on a household member (like the child or mother) to ask for
assistance. Instead, they permit judges and caseworkers unilaterally to remove the offender.136
Maine’s Department of Human Services can petition for a protective order on behalf of a child
who has been abused by a family member and Maine law allows the court temporarily to enjoin
the abuser ex parte from “[e]ntering the family residence.”137 After a hearing, this order may be
made permanent for up to 2 years.138 Tennessee authorizes its CPS agency to apply for a “no
contact order” removing the alleged perpetrator from the child’s home if there is probable cause
that the adult sexually abused the child.139 Other states also authorize state agencies to take such
steps.140
133
134
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III. DISTRUST OF THE NON-OFFENDING PARENT

Numerous studies show that most caseworkers fiercely believe mothers share the blame for
abuse. In the 1990s, a series of studies showed that 70 to 86% of all CPS professionals placed
some blame on mothers, both for father-daughter incest and for extra-familial sexual abuse.141
Some studies asked caseworkers to assign relative responsibility for the abuse. In these, the
fractional share of responsibility attributed to mothers for the abuse ranged from 11 to 21%.142
In Australia, Jan Breckenridge and Eileen Baldry found that 61% of child protection workers felt
that some mothers knew of the abuse, while one in ten believed that most mothers actually knew
about the abuse. 143 In the United States, Patricia Ryan and colleagues found that in 82.3% of the
case reports from five state, county, and private welfare agencies, caseworkers believed the
mothers knew about the abuse before it was reported.144
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These suppositions of “maternal culpability” drive the choice to remove the child.145
Assessments of “mother’s ability and willingness to protect her child (1) before and (2) after the
report of abuse … best explain[ed] the pattern of removal.”146 82% of the case files indicated
that mothers knew of the abuse.147

There is little support for this belief, however. As Ryan and colleagues flatly observe,
“[a]lthough the myth has been widely held that [the non-abusing mother] is usually aware of the
abuse and may contrive in setting it up, this is infrequently the case.”148 In a study of 65 cases of
paternal incest, Kathleen Faller found that a mere 5% of mothers knew about the daughter’s
abuse but “felt powerless to stop it.”149 A study of grandfather incest found that 87% of mothers
never knew.150 In 1985, M.H. Myer found that at least 75% of mothers were unaware of their
partner’s abuse.151 As Rebecca Bolen notes, across these studies, “75% to 95% of mothers do
not know about the ongoing abuse.”152
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This is not surprising. Often, child victims never speak of their abuse. Marcellina Mian and
colleagues found that the rate of purposeful (as opposed to unintentional) disclosure by the child
decreased significantly when the perpetrator was intra-familial.153 While a child’s disclosure
may not be the only clue, other cues are also frequently absent.

Sexual abuse is difficult to detect by non-offending mothers because one third of sexually
abused children have no apparent symptoms.154 Roughly half fail to display the classic, most
characteristic symptom of child sexual abuse: "sexualized" behavior.155 And as disquieting as it
is, "the more severe cases [are] the ones most likely to remain secret.”156 Diana Russell reports
that in 72% of the cases where mothers were unaware of the abuse, more severe abuse had
occurred.157 All of this makes one wonder precisely how mothers should have ferreted out their
children’s abuse. Clearly, “[m]others cannot report what they do not know.”158

Of course, mothers can be complicit in a child’s abuse. For instance, in People v. T.G., a
mother knew that her husband – the children’s stepfather – was sexually abusing his
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stepdaughters, but she concealed it.159

Nonetheless, absent unambiguous indications of a

mother’s complicity, caseworkers should assume that mothers did not simply go along.

Nor is there any reason to believe that non-abusing mothers are not protective after the abuse
comes to light. Most are “very” or “mostly” protective once they find out. A 1990 study found
that 74% of non-abusing mothers “either totally or largely believed the child’s account of abuse,”
while 67% of mothers were rated by the caseworkers as having average or better compliance
with the caseworker’s recommended treatment plan.160 A1991 study by Ryan and colleagues, in
which caseworkers harshly assessed mothers’ knowledge of their child’s abuse, found that over
half the mothers (50.8%) acted “mostly” or “very” protective following the report.161
Importantly, most mothers believed the disclosure.

Elizabeth Sirles and Pamela Franke

discovered that 78% of mother’s believe the child’s report of alleged abuse.162 Although some
studies show that only a quarter of non-offending mothers were “very supportive,”163 such
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studies are a distinct minority.164

One meta-analysis concluded that “75% of nonoffending

guardians are partially or fully supportive after disclosure [of sexual abuse].”165

In any event, if an unspoken concern that a “mother who failed once will fail again” is
forcing CPS’s decision to remove kids from the home, caseworkers should assess the likelihood
of a failure prospectively, with validated assessment tools, rather than based only on the fact of
the child’s past abuse. Such tools exist in various jurisdictions inside and outside the US and are
used for precisely this purpose.166 For instance, New Zealand utilizes a Risk Estimation System
to evaluate a number of risk factors in child abuse and neglect proceedings, including a mother’s
proptective abilities.167

Illinois assesses a mother’s protective capacities when deciding to

remove an alleged offender from the home, although Illinois’ methodology has not been
validated.168 Rebecca Bolen has laid the theoretical groundwork to assess the protective
capacities of non-offending mothers and has validated one instrument to do so.169
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IV. REMOVAL OF THE ALLEGED OFFENDER PROTECTS NOT JUST THE VICTIM BUT
ALSO THE OTHER CHILDREN IN THE HOME

Ironically, a default remedy that removes the child from the home, rather than removing the
alleged offender pending a full investigation, sometimes leaves other children in the home at risk
of abuse from the same individual. The risk of substituting child victims is perhaps easiest to see
with claims of child sexual abuse.170

When a male parent sexually engages a child in his care, a question frequently arises about
the safety of other children in the household. For a state to intervene to protect these children,
the state must show that the sibling more probably than not faces substantial risk of imminent
harm from the alleged offender.171 Once proven, it may remove the child, supervise the family,
or mandate “voluntary” treatment for the perpetrator.172

predictably exploit occasions on which a child’s mother is not present. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at
Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 251, 307 (2001). A mother’s
protectiveness does bear on whether she will surreptiously permit the father to re-enter the house after being exluded
and, for this reason, is properly examined with the tools described above.
170

It is common in cases of child physical abuse also to have multiple victims in the same household. Alan Susman
& Martin Guggenheim, The Rights of Parents 73 (1980) (“The theory behind [a presumption of risk to siblings] is
that evidence of abuse or neglect of one child may indicate that other children in the same family are in extreme
danger of harm, and that it is not necessary for parents to maltreat each child in succession for a court to
intervene.”); Karen S. Kassebaum, The Siblings of Abused Children: Must They Suffer Harm Before Removal from
the Home?, 29 Creighton L. Rev. 1547 (1996) (charting the relationship between physical abuse of one child and
abuse of another).
171
FL. STAT. ANN. § 39.52(1)(b) (2001).

34

For a number of reasons, judges reach wildly different judgments regarding the risk to
children left in the perpetrator’s care.173 Courts in the United States generally react in one of the
three following ways.

A. No Clear Risk

Some courts see no clear risk to the victim’s siblings.

In In re Cindy B, the New York

Family Court refused to protect the siblings of an incest victim, finding that the State produced
no evidence “that the physical . . . condition of any [sibling] . . . is in imminent danger of
becoming impaired” despite the fact that the father admitted sexual intercourse with his oldest
daughter, Cindy.174 Fifteen years later, the New York Court of Appeals validated this approach
in In Re Starr H, where a mother’s live-in boyfriend inserted his finger into the vagina of the
mother’s twelve-year old daughter, Starr, while he “instructed her to lick his penis ‘like an ice
cream cone.’”175

The state CPS agency petitioned the court to protect Starr and her siblings.

Although the Court of Appeals found that Starr was an abused child, her sexual abuse – standing
alone – was insufficient to find substantial risk to her siblings.176 Similarly, Texas courts have
refused to see risk to a victim’s siblings in proceedings to terminate parental rights.177 In sum,
these courts courts consider sex with one child as an isolated act – a fluke – rather than as critical
evidence of a foreseeable pattern of predation.
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B. Obvious Risk to the Victim’s Siblings

In contrast to the “no-risk” view, the Ohio Court of Appeals in In re Burchfield viewed the
risk to a victim’s siblings as self-evident.178 It held that “a child should not have to endure the
inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to give the [parent] an opportunity to prove
[his] suitability.”179 The father digitally penetrated his five-year-old daughter on two separate
occasions. The court concluded “in light of [the daughter’s sexual abuse], it follows that so long
as the father was in the home with [her siblings] the environment of these children was such as to
warrant the state to assume guardianship.”180 Very simply, “the law does not require the court to
experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will suffer great detriment or harm.”181 Courts in
Arizona, California, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Washington, Pennsylvania,
and South Dakota also see this risk as a “no-brainer.”182

C. Prior Victimization is One Factor

In 2000, the Florida Supreme Court announced that a victim’s violation is relevant, but not
177
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dispositive, in determining the risk to a victim’s siblings. In In re MF, a father had “union” with
the vagina of his stepchild, who was under the age of 12.183 Following his incarceration, the
state CPS agency filed suit to remove the father’s two biological children from their mother’s
care based in part on the possibility of future abuse by the father. In a sharply divided per curiam
opinion, the Florida Supreme Court held that a parent’s commission of a sex act with one child
was, by itself, insufficient to support a ruling of dependency as to the victim’s siblings.

Even when judges agree about the risk to the victim’s siblings, however, they often differ
sharply about the impact of a sibling’s gender, age, ordinal position, and genetic relatedness on
the magnitude of the sibling’s risk.184 Despite these splits, courts can call on considerable social
science data to better protect the victim’s siblings, as the next sub-Part makes clear.

D. Unmistakable Evidence of the Risk to Other Children
The evidence of serial offending is overwhelming and chilling. Vincent De Francis studied
250 sexual abuse cases and found that 22% of perpetrators victimized between two and five
children.185 Kathleen Faller studied 196 paternal caretakers whom she classified in two ways:
biological father-offenders and father-substitutes, including stepfathers, mother’s cohabitants,
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and mother’s boyfriends.186 Faller found that four out of every five biological fathers abused
more than one child in the household, as did two out of three of the father substitutes.187 In many
cases, every child in the household was a victim of incest.188 Patricia Phelan found similar
results in a study of 102 cases of father-daughter incest. There, biological fathers molested 85%
of all daughters available to them, while stepfathers molested 70% of all available daughters.189

The pattern is repeated again and again. Judith Herman and Lisa Hirschman studied forty
families in which there were allegations of father-daughter incest.190 Victims in 53% of the
families reported another victim or that they “strongly suspected” incest with a sibling had taken
place.191

In 47% of the cases, the victims said there was no indication of other victims;

however, there were no other possible victims in the household in one-third of these families.192
Similarly, in Diana Russell’s landmark study of 930 women in San Francisco, one half of the
children abused by a stepfather reported at least one other sibling as a victim, while one-third of
the victims abused by a father reported other sibling-victims.193

Edward Farber studied the

medical records of 162 molestation cases, which yielded a smaller percentage of cases of repeat
incest with another child (28%).194 However, while 72% of the records Farber examined gave no
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indication of additional incest, in 41% of those cases, no one inquired whether there were other
victims.195

These figures may actually underestimate the incidence of serial predation given the intense
secrecy surrounding incest and the common belief by victims that they alone are being
molested.196

Other studies of incest perpetrators themselves also confirm that perpetrators frequently
access several children in their care. In a study of 373 incest offenders, David Ballard and
colleagues constructed a profile of perpetrators that included abuse history.197 They found that
33.9% had at least one additional incestuous relationship after the first.198 Although frightening
on its face, perhaps more terrifying is how this number breaks down. As one might expect, the
largest subgroup, 12.8%, had one additional incestuous relationship.199 The second largest
category, 8.4%, represented perpetrators who admitted five or more additional incestuous
relationships.200 Not surprisingly, Ballard concluded that incest offenders “often have histories
of large numbers of victims.”201
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Although the risk to siblings is clear, not all children are equally at risk. The gender of the
victim and siblings, as well as the age at which the victim’s abuse began, all affect the magnitude
of a sibling’s risk.202 Certain children face only a slim chance of becoming victims. For
instance, a son is at minimal risk following father-daughter incest that begins in the daughter’s
teenage years.203 Absent other indicators of risk, the male child in this household is not likely to
be victimized.204

Given these damning studies of serial victimization, the risk to siblings seems obvious.
Nonetheless, some early studies of recidivism among incest offenders suggested that an offender
– once caught – would just stop. These studies projected that only 4 to 10% of incest offenders
would be recidivists.205 New, and better constructed studies now suggest that incest offenders
remain a continuing threat.206 Yet, before assessing this new research, it is important to review
the early studies as they offer significant insights into the risk to siblings that have been
overlooked thus far.

In the early studies, incest offenders seemed much less threatening than offenders who strike
outside the home. Vikkie Sturgeon and John Taylor’s 1980 study of 260 mentally-disoriented
sex offenders compared the reconviction rates of heterosexual pedophiles, homosexual
202
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pedophiles, and incestuous offenders (whether heterosexual or homosexual), and found that
reconvictions for sexual crimes were 20% for heterosexual pedophiles compared to 15% for
homosexual pedophiles and 5% for incest offenders.207 Thus, incest offenders initially presented
only modest risks of re-offending.208 However, other evidence in the same study undercuts the
incest perpetrator’s image of relative safety. Looking at prior convictions for sexual crimes
within each group, the researchers found that 19% of incest offenders had prior convictions.209
Although this percentage fell significantly short of the percentages for heterosexual pedophiles
(43%) and homosexual pedophiles (53%), the findings nonetheless confirm that significant
numbers of child incest perpetrators – one in five – do indeed engage in a pattern of repeat
offenses.210

In short order, researchers began faulting the early studies. The Packard Foundation’s Center
for the Future of Children noted that recidivism is “extremely difficult to measure because many
sex crimes may not result in arrest or conviction [and because] . . . official data are often
inaccurate or outdated.”211 Recidivism studies yield misleading appraisals of risk as they largely
follow incarcerated offenders, which is not the typical sentence for incest.212 Finally, the early
206
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studies simply missed recidivism that occurred many years later, a frequent occurrence with
child molesters.213

Recent studies also take issue with the provincial belief that incest offenders will not reoffend. In the most prominent of these, Lea Studer and colleagues grouped 220 patients who
participated in an Alberta, Canada treatment program for sex offenders into offenders whose
index victims were related to them (incestuous offenders) and those who were caught with an
unrelated child (extra-familial abusers).214 They compared the rates at which each reported
offending against other children within and outside the home. Contrary to conventional wisdom,
“22% of the incestuous group had prior offenses against a related child,” suggesting that “repeat
offenses may not be so rare.”
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unrelated child reported violations against related children, making incest offenders statistically
nearly twice as likely to report other related victims.216 As Dr. Studer notes:
[I]f the ‘dogma’ [of the incest offender’s low propensity to re-offend] were
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discrete group), the [reported rate of other related victims among incest offenders]
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incestuous ones].217

The early distinction between incest offenders and other child molesters falls apart for other
reasons too.218 Incest offenders and child molesters who strike outside the family have “very
similar arousal patterns,” indistinguishable erotic preferences, and “disturbingly high” deviant
sexual arousal to children.219 Many child abuse researchers now question the extent to which
“different categories of offenders, particularly intra-familial and extra-familial, are different from
each other.”220 Indeed, the classification of sex offenders into two groups, incest offenders and
pedophiles, was “prematurely disseminated as [it does] not appear to be valid.”221 Clearly, the
older view that incest offenders are a special category who will not re-offend is invalid and must
be discarded.

Although these studies alone justify a presumption that a perpetrator who strikes once within
the family will strike again,222 there are a number of sound public policy reasons for presuming
217
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risk to other kids in the family. First, a presumption of risk assists CPS caseworkers who,
without clear guidelines, may be slow to react or may not act at all. Additionally, a presumption
fairly places the burden on the offender to prove the child’s safety and errs on the side of
additional protection for other children. After all, the offender is the primary determinant of
repeat performances. Finally, presuming risk gives courts judicial discretion to act protectively
if they sense risk to the siblings rather than requiring harm before acting.

Although this snapshot of serial predation warrants reforms I have outlined elsewhere — to
place the burden of proving the sibling’s safety on offenders, and to improve judicial predictions
of risk223—we should embrace fundamental change. The offender should be removed from the
home – pending a full investigation – rather than the victim. Part V explores a number of
possible limitations to excluding alleged offenders form the home, but argues that these are
easily overcome.

V. LIMITATIONS OF REMOVING ALLEGED OFFENDERS FROM THE HOME

Exclusion of alleged offenders is not without some potential problems. Just as a child who is
removed from his home may experience guilt, so may a child whose parent is ejected, especially
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when the “family suffers economically.”224 In addition, like the decision to remove a child, the
decision to exclude an alleged offender is made “against a background of urgency and
inadequate information” and will sometimes be unwarranted.225 However, the fact an allegation
may later prove unfounded should not, by itself, dissuade us from using this remedy. These error
costs are no greater than those that occur when the state removes a child who is later found not to
have been abused.

The real “difficulty with restraining orders is that they are hard to enforce and, in the case of
child sexual assault, depend upon the presence of an adult ally for the child to monitor the
situation and to report any violation of the restraining order.”226 Clearly, it is essential that the
non-abusing parent is alert. For example, British authorities will not exclude an accused parent
during an investigation if another adult in the home is not willing to care for the child227 or does
not consent to the exclusion.228 To secure a restraining order in Texas, the court must find that
the child “is not in danger of abuse from a parent ... with whom the child will continue to
reside.”229 The remaining parent must “make a reasonable effort to monitor the residence” and
agree to report any attempts by the excluded parent to return home.230 The failure to do these
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things is a misdemeanor, as is the perpetrator’s return to the residence.231 Although blanket
suppositions of a non-offending parent’s complicity in a child’s abuse are generally not
warranted, as discussed above, without the non-offending parent’s assistance and consent,
exclusion of the alleged offender is not an option.

It is possible that there are a set of women, especially those who are the victims of domestic
violence, who will not be sufficiently protective of their children after an allegation of child
abuse by their partner.

Given the overwhelming evidence that non-offending mothers are

supportive, however, the remedy to prevent such a failure would be a screen for domestic
violence, and more specifically, the failure of a battered spouse to fail to protect prospectively,
rather than than reflexive assumptions of such a failure by caseworkers.

A more intractable problem is the need to replace the income that the
alleged offender provides to the home during his absence.

For biological

fathers, paternity imposes a duty of support and provides one means of dealing
with the economic hardship that may result.232

Further, many states provide

for child support on a temporary basis; such emergency maintenance, in fact,
is often received by battered spouses whose partners have been excluded from
the home.233 Any reform of state law to permit an alleged offender’s removal
should provide explicitly for emergency maintenance, just as legislatures have
done in cases of domestic violence.
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foster care is horribly expensive, as Professor Garrison explains.234
Legislatures should also consider directing some of these savings into support
of the household that remains behind.

More fundamentally, however, the

possibility of financial hardship should not persuade us from removing alleged
offenders from the home, opting instead for removal of the child.

Financial

hardships do not restrain society from incarcerating or otherwise criminally
penalizing offenders.

Some costs are simply unavoidable.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is clear that [w]e need to develop alternatives to prosecution that can increase children’s
safety without making them leave their homes.”235 The easiest, most direct route to this is to
take the alleged offender out of the home, rather than the children. As the Washington state
legislature has declared, “removing the child from the home often has the effect of further
traumatizing the child. It is, therefore, the legislature's intent that the alleged offender, rather
than the child, shall be removed from the home and that this should be done at the earliest
possible point of intervention.”236

Although the perceived “inability to remove the offender” remains strong, Professor
Garrison’s public health model not only highlights the risks that wanton removal of child victims
poses for the child victim – and sometimes for the children left behind – but more importantly, it
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can guide us in constructing a safer path forward. Like the systemic issues she confronts,
Professor Garrison’s medical model can improve the crucial early decisions that put into motion
everything else. If we candidly embrace this powerful analytical tool, fewer children will
needlessly endure the trauma of being taken from the felt security of their home.237
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